“It is not the critic who counts: not the man who points out how the strong man stumbles or where the doer of deeds could have done better. The credit belongs to the man who is actually in the arena, whose face is marred by dust and sweat and blood, who strives valiantly, who errs and comes up short again and again, because there is no effort without error or shortcoming, but who knows the great enthusiasms, the great devotions, who spends himself for a worthy cause; who, at the best, knows, in the end, the triumph of high achievement, and who, at the worst, if he fails, at least he fails while daring greatly, so that his place shall never be with those cold and timid souls who knew neither victory nor defeat.”
Teddy Roosevelt, in a 1910 speech at the Sorbonne a year after his two-term presidency.
Remember when, in March 2023, at the height of the attempted constitutional coup when Benjamin Netanyahu sought to turn Israel from a democracy into a quasi-authoritarian Turkey or Hungary, he tried to fire Defense Minister Yoav Gallant for warning against the coup’s repercussions on national security?
Of course you do. Hundreds of thousands took to the streets in protest. Remember when, this past November, Netanyahu actually fired Gallant for his outspoken criticism of the management of the war and Netanyahu’s total capitulation to the ultra-Orthodox, who are trying to exempt their young men from military service?
Of course you do. Tens of thousands took to the streets. But do you know that this week Gallant resigned from the Knesset? You probably don’t. Nobody protested.
The media’s politics-as-usual treatment of Gallant’s resignation is anything but normal. This isn’t because his move has no political ramifications; there are potentially plenty of those. It’s because of the damning evidence of the jaded Israeli zeitgeist, a reflection of how Netanyahu has managed to desensitize public opinion.
It’s as if the post-traumatic stress disorder that has afflicted so many Israelis since October 7, 2023, has truly taken on a national scale. Years of Netanyahu pounding on the public consciousness have blurred the true and the false, normalized the abnormal, accepted the unacceptable, and sunk Israelis into despair about the country’s direction. Anger breeds apathy, and autocrats thrive on public apathy.
Netanyahu’s years in power have exacted a very high price on the Israeli psyche. He has been divisive, incessantly incited his followers, poisoned the national political discourse, fanned the flames between groups and endlessly manipulated the political system. Worse, his crude constitutional coup that declares war on Israeli democracy — the judiciary, the checks and balances and the state bureaucracy — has turned Israel into a jittery, precarious illiberal democracy on the verge of autocracy. And, on brand and imitating his soulmate Donald Trump, he wields the term “deep state.”
Meanwhile, the public arena is dominated by “whataboutism,” “bothsidesism,” moral relativism and fake news. As far as Netanyahu is concerned, Gallant was a fifth column in his extremist governing coalition by identifying all the developments above.
Gallant’s journey from almost-IDF chief of staff to tragic hero to arguably a coward who surrendered to Netanyahu is excellently described by my Haaretz colleague Amir Tibon in his piece Thursday on Gallant “fleeing the battlefield.”
When we talk about Gallant’s resignation — something almost forgotten by the time I typed out this column — one fundamental thing is overlooked: Netanyahu should have resigned, or announced his intention to do so, immediately after the calamity of October 7, 2023. If he had the integrity, the moral compass, the sense of responsibility and a minimal conception of accountability, he would have resigned there and then.
But that’s asking too much from Netanyahu. He was the prime minister on the worst day in Israeli history; his callous arrogance and failed policies led to Hamas’ barbaric attack.
But it’s not just about him. Gallant, IDF Chief of Staff Herzl Halevi, Military Intelligence chief Aharon Haliva, Southern Command head Yaron Finkelman and the head of the Shin Bet security service, Ronen Bar, should all have indicated their intention to resign. Some have, but only Haliva has actually left, stating his responsibility for the intelligence failure.
Netanyahu, who is increasingly inclined toward an endless war and a perpetual military presence in Gaza, underpins his makeshift policy with a distinct logic. Yes, the conventional wisdom is that his approach has always been about political expediency, but there is more. Five, six and seven months ago, Netanyahu repeatedly resisted a cease-fire and hostage deal because this would deprive him of the “total victory” he has constantly blustered about. A cease-fire wouldn’t achieve his stated “eradication and obliteration of Hamas.”
Gallant, who as defense minister concluded that all attainable military goals in Gaza had been achieved and that the war was dragging on only because of Netanyahu’s political and legal interests, was then royally dismissed. The war continues, with Israel for the fourth time entering Jabalya in northern Gaza, returning to places where it thought it had wiped out Hamas. It’s also considering a full occupation of Gaza City and admitting that Hamas’ ability to recruit has increased.
Consider this comparison: The Allies invaded Normandy on June 6, 1944. Berlin fell on May 2, 1945. That’s 11 months. Hamas attacked Israel on October 7, 2023. Israel is still lingering aimlessly in Gaza on January 3, 2025. That’s 15 months. Berlin is 1,268 kilometers, or 788 miles, from Omaha Beach. Gaza is 100 meters, or 109 yards, from Israel, basically the length of a football field.
Now, emboldened by military successes against Hezbollah and Iran, and possibly also by the election of Trump, Netanyahu’s logic has been solidified.
A hostage deal will inevitably include a cease-fire, even if temporary. The prime minister will then face the reality of never having engaged in crafting a postwar political framework for Gaza.
If the war ends now, Hamas hasn’t surrendered but Israel effectively owns Gaza. A cease-fire, combined with the cease-fire in Lebanon, will probably entail an unofficial cease-fire with the Houthis in Yemen, because the rationale for their missile launches — the wars in Gaza and Lebanon — has been removed. Once that happens, the ostensible justification for a preemptive strike on Iran’s nuclear installations diminishes, right at the most opportune time.
That doesn’t mean there won’t be an attack, but Israel needs to see what the Trump administration’s policy on Iran is. Netanyahu’s challenge will be to convince Trump that continuing the war in Gaza and later in the year striking Iran is a feasible policy that the 47th president can win credit for, with the policy also conducive to expanding the Abraham Accords to include Saudi Arabia.
Netanyahu is sure that he can easily manipulate the old-new president and that Trump couldn’t care less about Gaza and will be malleable on Iran. So the war will go on with no political objectives aligned to military maneuvering. But Netanyahu won’t have Gallant to kick around anymore.
First published in Haaretz, 03.01.2025
