In recent months, Naftali Bennett seems to be enjoying a public revival. He appears on screens, lectures at conferences, and rolls his eyes with false statesmanship, as if he were the last “enlightened” prime minister—the one who “saved” Israel from the abyss. But hypocrisy has its limits. The 20 seats he’s receiving in polls—while Bezalel Smotrich barely passes the threshold and Itamar Ben Gvir maintains his power—show that among centrists and leftists there are many “strategic” or simply naïve voters.
Bennett has found fertile ground for rewriting history. Behind the artificial halo stands a politician who grew from the nationalist-messianic right, promoted settlement expansion, pushed for annexing most of the West Bank, and ignored the Palestinians—directly contributing to the conditions that empowered Hamas and led to the collapse of October 7.
Bennett was never moderate. Quite the opposite: he legitimized political messianism and prepared the ground for the rise of ultra-nationalist forces—the same forces that opened the door to Smotrich and Ben Gvir. Anyone who now praises Bennett’s “achievements” must re-examine his record and its long-term consequences.
Bennett entered politics with a clear agenda: blocking the creation of a Palestinian state. In 2012 he launched his “Stabilization Plan,” whose first principle was the unilateral annexation of Area C. “Israel will act independently and fortify its vital interests,” he said. When asked about Gaza, he replied—blind to regional reality—that it was “already practically part of Egypt.” Fully aware of the sensitivities, he still wrote with arrogance: “The world won’t recognize our sovereignty there… it’ll get used to it over time” (Ynet, 23 Feb 2012).
At a time when Likud still sometimes pretended to moderation abroad, Bennett made his aim explicit: annexation. “We must move from defense to decision; our dream is for Judea and Samaria to be part of sovereign Israel,” he declared in Jerusalem in 2016. His “Stabilization Plan” envisioned permanent Israeli military control and Palestinian enclaves without territorial continuity—essentially identical to Smotrich’s later proposal.
In government, Bennett repeatedly advanced policies that deepened Israel’s control over the West Bank. As education minister, he infused the system with messianic ideology, saying: “We must restore pride in Zionism, without apology.” The result: politicization of education and exclusion of critical voices. As defense minister, he strengthened the army as a tool of settlement policy.
Israelis tend to forget Bennett’s words and deeds. He made clear time and again his opposition to a Palestinian state—“Our ancestors and descendants will not forgive a leader who divides our land” (Maariv, 11 Aug 2014)—and never changed his stance. His anti-liberal worldview, shared with Shaked, Ben Gvir, and Smotrich, glorified militarism: “We will live forever by the sword.” In a 2015 Facebook post to soldiers he wrote, “One day you’ll be home with your wife and kids under a warm blanket—then new soldiers will guard you.”
He even urged soldiers before elections to persuade their comrades to vote for his party.
In August 2024, Globes’ fact-checking project Mishrokit exposed false statistics he spread about Muslims in Europe—some unverifiable, others nonexistent.
He didn’t invent attacks on the judiciary either. In 2015 he warned against “judicial tyranny” and backed a Basic Law amendment enabling disqualification of Knesset candidates based on their statements, shifting the burden of proof to them. In 2023 he told NBC that “broad consensus” existed for judicial reform because the Supreme Court “does not fairly represent all opinions.”
When Bennett became prime minister in 2021, many claimed he had changed. He sat with Lapid, Michaeli, and Horowitz, and for the first time included an Arab Islamist party, Ra’am, in the coalition—a rare moment that seemed to challenge the messianic narrative. But his policy toward Palestinians remained the same. In a Yesha Council speech he compared peace efforts to an unnecessary operation removing a “shard from the backside,” insisting Israel must simply “live with it.” His government advanced over 7,000 new housing units in settlements—a record even compared with previous right-wing governments. Internationally too, he accelerated settlement expansion while posing as a “pragmatist.”
In Gaza, the same pattern persisted: strengthening Hamas as an alternative to the Palestinian Authority. The cynical logic was that as long as Hamas ruled Gaza, there was “no one to talk to.” Economic concessions to Hamas continued—Qatari salary payments, more work permits—all under the “conflict-management” doctrine that sowed the winds which brought the storm of October 7.
Bennett believed Israel could expand settlements without paying a price, weaken the PA without losing stability, and tolerate Hamas as long as it was “quiet.” That pessimism laid the groundwork for the despair fueling Palestinian terror. Hamas became richer, stronger, deadlier. As defense minister, Bennett’s greatest failure was embracing “conflict management.” He weakened the PA further, offering token economic gestures while proudly refusing to meet Abu Mazen or discuss diplomacy (Srugim, 17 Aug 2022).
Meanwhile, he helped legitimize the messianic right. As leader of HaBayit HaYehudi, he collaborated with those who saw settlements as a redemptive mission. He avoided confronting Ben Gvir, thus paving the way for Religious Zionism and Jewish Power—parties that later captured the finance and national security ministries. “Whoever lets tigers into the political cage shouldn’t be surprised when they devour the keeper.”
Bennett’s clean image, fluent English, and calm tone granted him an aura of responsibility that deceived both Israeli centrists and the foreign press. Yet the gap between image and reality is vast.
Historically, Bennett appears as both the prime minister who formed a coalition with an Arab party—an unprecedented step—and a politician who deepened the occupation and empowered extremists. These two faces complement each other: Ra’am served as his fig leaf while he quietly advanced the messianic agenda.
Right-wing leaders had long used the same tactic—moderate façade, annexation in practice—but Bennett perfected it and sold it to the center-left. That is his greatest political success and his most destructive legacy.
Israelis love myths, and Bennett exploited that. Draped in the image of “the responsible savior,” he now calls himself a pragmatic unifier. When asked if he might return to politics, he replied: “I don’t rule anything out. If I see the country in danger, I’ll consider returning” (Globes, 12 June 2024). The irony is sharp: the man who helped create the danger portrays himself as the one to rescue us from it.
He has already founded a new party—Bennett 2026—and appears frequently in international media as Israel’s self-appointed advocate.
Let it be stated clearly: Naftali Bennett is not the “responsible alternative.” He is part of the failure.
Anyone who weakened the Palestinian Authority, strengthened Hamas, and legitimized Smotrich and Ben Gvir cannot be the savior. He shares full responsibility for the chaos.
The lesson for the future is clear: if Israel wishes to recover from the trauma of October 7, it must stop clinging to false myths and stop treating those who created the problem as part of the solution. Bennett, like Netanyahu and the rest of the messianic right, belongs to a past we must leave behind.
Those who vote for him will also bear responsibility for the policies that already led us to disaster.
What Israel needs is leadership that understands: the conflict cannot be managed forever; settlements cannot keep expanding without destroying stability; and extremists cannot be legitimized without dismantling democracy.
As long as the public remains captive to fake narratives of “responsible leaders” like Bennett, the future will mirror the present—another cycle of delusion and ruin.
Voters must resist “strategic voting” and choose those who truly represent their values.
First published in Haaretz, 09.10.2025