Neither Canada nor any one of its 10 provinces or three territories will become the 51st state of the American Union. Greenland will not be bought from Denmark, the Panama Canal will not be “returned” to the United States and Mexico will not be invaded by the U.S. military.
Putting these recent unhinged, infantile, pseudo-foreign policy remarks from Donald Trump aside, the world that awaits the U.S. president-elect is starkly different from the one he thinks he remembers from when he left the White House in January 2021.
Trump’s basic instincts and guiding predispositions about the world may not have changed. But the global landscape and regional geopolitical balances of power have.
China, Russia, North Korea, Iran, Europe and NATO are not in the same place they were when he was president between 2017 and 2021. Whatever his natural proclivities, he will have to make significant adjustments as to how he interacts with the world during his second term.
The two main characteristics most commonly associated with Trump’s political personality are that he is inherently unpredictable and transactional. There’s a contradiction there, since if he is always transactional, he is therefore subject to predictability. In any event, both traits will come into play in his foreign policy and both may lead to surprises — negative or positive — in how he deals with the world.
Throughout his latest campaign, true to form with his patented bluster, hyperbole and false facts, Trump described America as a broken country: desolate, crime-infested, swamped by illegal immigrants, governed by an unelected “deep state” and dominated by cunning liberal elites.
During that four-year campaign, he also portrayed it as an ailing Third World economy, exploited by greedy trade partners, taken for a ride by so-called allies, exhibiting weakness in global affairs, capitulating to China. America, he said, is a laughingstock around the world.
While disparaging incumbent opponents is a common campaign strategy in modern politics, the disconnect between Trump’s angry depiction of a hellscape America and the real numbers and data is staggering.
The murder rate in America is significantly down. There are no U.S. troops embroiled in foreign wars. Illegal immigration is in fact lower than it was during Trump’s last year in office. The stock market has just enjoyed its best two years over the past quarter century; jobs are up; wages are moderately rising; U.S. domestic energy production is higher than it ever was; and tens of billions of dollars were invested in derelict infrastructure.
By almost every conventional and measurable metric, Trump will inherit an America doing significantly better than the America he left Joe Biden in January 2021.
This obviously wasn’t enough to convince voters, still angry at the COVID-19 pandemic and ensuing inflation. They were also confounded by divisive cultural issues.
In a Gallup survey conducted a month after the election, a meager 19 percent of Americans said they were “satisfied with the direction of the country.” America, split evenly between red and blue, elected Trump — who somehow but very successfully managed to frame himself as the “change candidate.”
Americans did not vote on foreign policy issues in November. They never do. Trump’s agenda, like almost all presidents before him, is domestic: the economy, immigration, energy, curtailing the civil service, broad deregulation, downsizing the federal government and budgets by $2 trillion.
In general, presidents prioritize domestic issues. They run campaigns on patently domestic issues, make promises on economic and social domestic issues that “the American people care about,” and press a legislative agenda that is domestic.
Yet circumstances arise and crises present themselves that compel presidents to divert attention to foreign policy. Trump already inherits lingering wars in Ukraine and the Middle East, but the global picture is far broader. The two Central European powers of France and Germany are undergoing political turmoil, as is South Korea — another staunch U.S. ally.
Trump’s instinctive support for Russian President Vladimir Putin, disdain for Volodymyr Zelenskyy and criticism of U.S. military support of Ukraine will raise transatlantic tensions in NATO — an alliance he is vociferously critical of and sees no utility in to begin with.
While Trump may concede to Russian demands in a cease-fire agreement with Ukraine, the Putin he admired is now three years into a failed war and closely cooperating and expanding relations with Iran. There is nothing Trump despises more than what he calls “losers.” Would he offer to lift sanctions on Russia, allowing it to export oil and natural gas freely, but impose even more sanctions on Iran? In exchange for what?
North Korea made progress in its nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities, and is now much closer to being able to mount a nuclear warhead on a ballistic missile with sufficient range to strike the Pacific Northwest. Would Trump renew his bromance with Kim Jong Un? In exchange for what? Denuclearization? And what if North Korea rejects the idea? That would make Japan and South Korea jittery.
If Trump applies the same alliance-averse attitude he has toward NATO and undoes the Indo-Pacific alliance that Biden began to develop, America’s allies in the Pacific — namely Japan, South Korea, Australia and the Philippines — will adopt a more independent posture, and the first two would likely consider developing a nuclear capability of their own.
Regardless of how real, coordinated and effective they are as a group — mostly they are not — China, Russia, Iran and North Korea are perceived in the West as some sort of new “axis of evil.” They may not coordinate policies, but there are patterns of cooperation and mutual support. Trump may want to do a Nixon-Kissinger maneuver and unlink China and Russia. However, 2025 is not 1972, and not even pre-Ukraine war 2021.
While Ukraine and the Middle East — particularly Iran, but not Gaza — will top Trump’s in tray, China will dominate and define his foreign policy.
Trump repeats his threats and promises to impose trade tariffs on China on an almost daily basis. But the problem with tariffs is not only the spike in “Made in China” goods for the American consumer, but China’s indispensability in global supply chains. This, many warn Trump, is counterproductive. He may want to focus on the trade imbalance with China and unfair trade practices used by the Chinese for years.
But the real crisis may come if China actually tests America’s resolve on Taiwan and the expanding Chinese presence in the South China Sea. In the event of China quarantining Taiwan and laying economic siege to the island — or, in the worst-case scenario, invading it — America will face a formidable challenge to its global hegemony, even if Trump tends to deride that position as needlessly expensive.
Based on Trump’s past statements and aversion to alliances, the United States may not even exhibit any resolve at all. In fact, he could conceivably agree to a grand bargain with Chinese President Xi Jinping and sacrifice Taiwan and the Philippines if he believes he got a good trade deal in exchange. Xi will say: “This is not about ‘world order,’ only about spheres of influence. You have Panama, I have Taiwan. We can both work together on a new nuclear deal with Iran” — and Trump may agree with the logic.
The immediate concern would be Taiwan’s world-leading semiconductor industry. Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company makes about 90 percent of the world’s advanced computer chips — which are critical components in the car and medical devices industries. Trump is already under pressure from U.S. manufacturers that Taiwan has an unfair advantage.
However, acquiescing to China’s policy may violate two U.S. commitments. First, the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, which determines that any violent move to threaten Taiwan’s economic autonomy would be a matter of “grave concern to the United States.” If any Taiwanese believes Trump will invoke that provision, I have a wall in China to sell them.
Second, in 1982 China made a commitment to pursue unification with Taiwan through “peaceful measures.” If any Taiwanese believes Xi Jinping is honor-bound by a 1982 commitment made by Zhao Ziyang, I also have a Hangzhou Bay Bridge to sell them.
Trump was never an “American Order” advocate. He never saw the advantages of American hegemony either. For him, that requires immense investment for little return.
This approach may be an ominous sign of how he will deal with global crises, how he will manage relations with allies — whom he does not necessarily see as allies — and how he will project and exert American power. With all that in mind, his trademark unpredictability may also yield some successes.
First published in Haaretz, 07.01.2025
