There are very few countries that have a hold on Israeli decision-makers and public opinion as Israel’s new Gulf allies do. Most Israelis view the UAE and Bahrain as not only attractive, lucrative economic partners, and one of the only tourist destinations in the Arab world open for them to explore, but essential strategic assets. That is also true for Saudi Arabia, which many Israelis regard as the aspirational jewel in the crown for Israel’s integration in the region.
That’s why at a time Israelis are having trouble agreeing on just about anything, most do agree on the importance of preserving a strong relationship with them, the prize of the much-touted Abraham Accords. That’s why any significant deterioration in relations with them will be criticized inside Israel.
And perhaps more importantly, such deterioration can have a devastating effect on future attempts of Israel to expand its relations in the Middle East, and it will make it difficult for the minority within the Arab world that does support ties with Israel.
The current government in Israel is seen in the Gulf as “far-right”, “ultranationalist, and ultra-Orthodox government — the most right-wing in Israeli history”. But that view alone is not enough to damage the relations, as the Emirati leaders always mention that, for them, normalization is with the state of Israel rather than a specific government or prime minister.
In such a frenzied and eventful period in Israel, its foreign relations are shaking. The Arab world, including the UAE and Bahrain, are more concerned about the deadly escalation in the West Bank. Speaking at the UN Security Council meeting on the Palestinian question last March, the UAE representative noted in his statement that “last year was the most violent year in nearly two decades, and unfortunately the beginning of this year indicates that the worst is yet to come.”
For the Arab countries, the escalation is much more than blood, manifested in legislative steps and provocative rhetoric made by the Israeli government which undermine the two-state solution. Arab countries that have normalized relations with Israel have to work harder than other Arab countries to highlight their pro-Palestinian position. Their relations with Israel are largely perceived as abandonment of the Palestinians, while in fact they promote the Palestinian interests much more than other “neutral” Arab states.
The intensity and magnitude of the events in Israel and Palestine are driving the UAE and Bahrain to be more vocal and active on the Palestinian issue than before. The criticism of the UAE and Bahrain toward Israel since the current Israeli government took office has never been so severe. The UAE condemned Israel four times in March alone, in addition to condemnations in UAE’s broader platforms such as the Gulf Cooperation Council, the Arab League, and several UAE statements at the UN Security Council.
These condemnations refer to building of West Bank settlements, inciteful rhetoric such as Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich’s denial of the Palestinian people, activities of the Israeli army in the West Bank cities of Jenin and Nablus, and the visit by the National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir to the Temple Mount, which they referred to as “storming of Al-Aqsa Mosque courtyard by an Israeli minister”. Bahrain is also speaking out harshly against Israeli ministers, saying that “moral and human values and principles, spread hate speech and violence and undermine international peace efforts.” Notably, the UAE and Bahrain also condemn terror attacks against Israeli citizens.
Beyond statements, there has also been some action. For example, UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed, known as MBZ, decided to donate $3 million to support rebuilding efforts in the West Bank village of Hawara in a direct and swift response to the rampage of Jewish settlers there in late February. MBZ’s step sends a clear message both to Israel and the Palestinians that the UAE does not favor one side over another and denounces extremism by all means.
The UAE has clearly declared what would be its two red lines, which the current government is starting to challenge but has not yet crossed: annexation of the West Bank and changing the status quo in the Temple Mount. So while there is palpable tension, the Gulf countries are leaving some room for Israel to maneuver and moderate its tone. We see that in what is not happening diplomatically. There have been no recalling ambassadors or formally announcing the downgrading of the relations. It is also demonstrated in the language they use that somewhat isolates Ben-Gvir and Smotrich from the rest of the government.
Despite the simmering tensions, the current relations between Israel and its Gulf allies are mostly business as usual. To be more specific, it is mostly business more than any other sector. In the peak of escalation, during March, the UAE Minister of Economy promoted a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement, CEPA, that includes Israel, the Emirati ambassador to Israel signed a customs agreement between the countries in the presence of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, and the two countries have agreed to increase the number of flights to meet the high demand for passenger traffic between the two countries.
On the diplomatic level, the working teams of the Negev Forum and I2U2 are maintaining dialogues, but at low and medium official level. We haven’t witnessed, for example, an official meeting between ministers, not to mention an official visit of a head of state between either the UAE or Bahrain and Israel.
The patience of the Gulf allies stems largely from the fact that Israel is a key part of a larger strategic calculation to achieve stability and deterrence in the region, especially now in the increasing absence of a significant superpower. They know that U.S. attention has been increasingly diverted to the Far East, leaving a vacuum in the region which regional players are trying to fill by creating regional alliances, like theirs with Israel.
Under these conditions, Israel has, until now at least, filled a meaningful role as a country which can provide security, stability and open more doors in Washington. But now, the latter two elements are at risk, with Israel’s domestic instability and its tenuous relations lately with the U.S. Israel’s very status and position in the Middle East is under threat.
The coalition agreements of the Israeli government include an article that binds the parties to maintain the Abraham Accords. Israeli coalition members know quite well how essential it is to safeguard these ties. Another article in these coalition agreements conveys the intention to expand the normalization process with other countries, alluding to Saudi Arabia. Netanyahu’s election campaign even mentioned potential normalization with Saudi Arabia as a main goal. But this goal has become more elusive in the three months Netanyahu has been in power.
We know Netanyahu is motivated to present achievements in the Gulf. Does this mean the UAE and Bahrain could pressure Israel to treat the Palestinians better? Netanyahu, using the specter of disgruntled Gulf countries, could put pressure on the more extreme factions in his government, but while the fragile Abrahamic spirit may take some effort to stabilize, no one will be able to fix crossing of the Gulf’s red lines.
First published in Haaretz, 02.04.2023
