Amid the chaos, polarization and internal fracture in Israel, a tectonic shift is taking place that many in the Jewish mainstream, and especially in the center-left camp, are missing: Arab society in Israel has undergone an accelerated political transformation. Instead of withdrawing in the face of an extreme right-wing government perceived as hostile, the Arab public wants to be involved also in foreign affairs and is demanding a seat at the decision-making table.
A recent survey conducted by Prof. Gilad Hirschberger and Prof. Sivan Hirsch-Hoefler of the Tamarur–Politography research group points to practical civic integration and social changes, alongside firm national positions and criticism of the state leadership’s management of the conflict.
The “demographic demon,” which politicians used for decades as a tool of fearmongering, is gradually dissipating. The share of the Arab population is stabilizing at 21.1 percent of Israel’s total population. Alongside the decline in fertility, a revolution is taking place in higher education. Arabs today constitute about 19 percent of all undergraduate students, and there are already more than 1,000 Arab doctoral students, out of about 12,000. A new generation, educated, self-confident and aspiring to mobility, is reshaping Arab society.
One of the most prominent changes concerns attitudes toward politics, and particularly toward joining a coalition. Despite the alienation they experience from the government, 70 percent of respondents in the survey accept the majority’s decision and prefer a democratically elected government, even if they disagree with its policies. But the real shift concerns the desire to influence. In the past, sitting in a Zionist government was taboo. Today, 55.7 percent of respondents state that they would “definitely not” vote for an Arab party that declares in advance that it would refuse to join a coalition. The Arab voter is tired of the Arab parties’ retreat to the opposition benches and demands pragmatism from them. About 58 percent of respondents want the formation of a center-left government with the participation of Arab parties.
Support for civic integration does not stem from blindness regarding the state of Israeli democracy, nor does it express a retreat on the Palestinian issue. Most of the Arab public believes that democracy is in danger as long as control over the territories of the West Bank continues. Unlike many in the Jewish center, who prefer to ignore the issue, for most Arab citizens a substantive liberal democracy cannot coexist with occupation of the territories, and this position is expected to affect their vote.
The deepest perceptual gap between the Jewish and Arab mainstream is revealed in relation to October 7: the survey reflects a position that must be acknowledged. About 90 percent of the Arab public do not support the massacre carried out by Hamas, but nearly 70 percent attribute the main blame for the massacre to the occupation. Contrary to the prevailing conception among Jews, according to which the occupation of Gaza ended with the disengagement, Arabs identify the policy of closure and the separation of the Strip from the West Bank as a continuation of Israeli control over the Strip.
This is also where the key to a solution lies. The Arab public remains the most stable and consistent ideological camp in its support for peace: support for the two-state solution is sweeping and reaches more than 75 percent. At the same time, like Jews, the Arab public views the unilateral separation from Gaza as a failed experiment. Unlike the Jewish public, it tends to blame the Israeli government for the failure, because it sees the unilateral separation paradigm as a solution that does not address the essential needs of the Palestinians: independence and freedom of movement.
In addition to interest in the diplomatic-security debate, the Arab public today demands partnership in the management of national moves: more than two-thirds of respondents believe that the Palestinian Authority should govern the Gaza Strip on the “day after” the war, and most expect their leaders in the Knesset to take an active part in shaping policy on the issue. The demand for influence has expanded from matters of budgeting and violence within Arab society to a pursuit of partnership also in shaping foreign and security policy.
Another sensitive issue is the question of Haram al-Sharif, the Temple Mount. About 95 percent of respondents state unequivocally that the site should remain under Muslim control. This figure clarifies the background to violent eruptions in the past, from the events of October 2000 to Operation Guardian of the Walls in 2021, which broke out alongside restrictions imposed on the mosques of the Temple Mount. But when respondents were asked to consider the establishment of a Palestinian state to which sovereignty over the Temple Mount would be transferred, a move that could require Arab citizens of Israel to cross an international border in order to pray at the mosque, support for the idea fell to 63.5 percent. This figure shows that despite their deep religious identity, most Arab citizens of Israel feel a strong attachment to the Israeli reality, and are not quick to give up the convenience or free access to Haram al-Sharif that derive from their being citizens of the state.
With regard to the war with Iran as well, the Arab public demonstrates a sober reading of reality: while it is almost completely divided on the question of whether the war will contribute to renewing the peace process with the Palestinians, a clear majority assesses that the current confrontation will actually lead to the expansion of the Abraham Accords with Arab states. In other words, the Arab public correctly evaluates the strength of Israel’s regional alliances with the pragmatic Arab world, even if it remains skeptical regarding the achievements that can be attained in the Palestinian arena following the war.
This survey shatters a long series of myths: Arab society is not disconnected, and it is not an insular community that rejects the existence of the State of Israel, and certainly not a fifth column. It is a society undergoing accelerated processes of education, and it opposes terrorism, while insisting on its demand for an end to the occupation as the only guarantee of Israeli democracy. More than anything, it is a society that explicitly demands to be a full partner in the leadership of the state.
If the center-left camp, or the entire democratic camp in Israel, ever wants to return to power and secure the future of the state, it must stop treating the Arab public as mandates meant only to serve as a safety net, or alternatively as a threat to be managed. It must begin seeing them as strategic and political partners in building a governing alternative, through a fair allocation of internal resources, shaping the outline for the “day after” in Gaza, and returning the two-state solution to the public debate. This is a historic moment in which the Arab voter is extending a hand for active coalition partnership. Those who continue to ignore the outstretched hand will condemn themselves to many more years on the opposition benches.
First published in Haaretz, 14.05.2026
